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Entrent alors en jeu les textes, ces enchaînements de phrases qui, comme le mot l'indique,
sont des textures qui tissent le discours en séquences plus ou moins longues. Le récit est
l'une des plus remarquables de ces séquences [...]. Mais il y aussi toutes les autres sortes
de textes, où on fait autre chose que raconter, par exemple argumenter, comme on en fait
en morale, en droit, en politique. Intervient ici la rhétorique avec ses figures de style, ses
tropes, métaphore et autres, et tous les jeux de langage au service de stratégies
innombrables, parmi lesquelles la séduction et l'intimidation aux dépens de l'honnête
souci de convaincre. (« Le paradigme de la traduction », Paul Ricoeur, 1999: 18)

I do not believe that we can read an argued text -- follow it, understand it, criticize it -without noticing the ways in wh14ich rhetoric comes in. This would be uncontroversial if
everyone did indeed note, in their reading and in their teaching, how the ways in which
something is said, figuratively or properly, can determine what is said. But not everyone does
and even those who do have a tendency to see rhetoric as an add-on. So an argued text is said to
have dimensions or tiers: a narrative, rhetorical one that, at its best, sets things up, builds bridges,
and smooths over rough patches; an argumentative one where all the real work is done, the p's
and q's wear the trousers (as Austin might put it). Then this may get taken by those of us who
prefer a proper dress code, or are harder-nosed, as an invitation to cut through the rhetoric, to pay
it no heed at all (just the facts, mind the p's and q's).
I want to show that taking rhetoric to be only a dimension or feature of an argued text
separable from the what, and calling for a special eye or ear, can lead us to miss or misconstrue
some of the proof. I want to show this inseparability by looking at an argued text.
Paul Ricoeur's text, "Le paradigme de la traduction," will be our test case. There are some
pretty good reasons for making it a test case. Firstly, this text is argued and makes abundant use
of rhetoric. Moreover, in this text, Ricoeur claims that rhetoric and argument are inseparable,
but does not spend much time backing the claim up (cf. inter alia, Ricoeur, 1975: 13-47, 1986:
263-288, 2000: 16). So, showing how rhetoric does some real work in this text will give us a bit
of both the pudding and the proof. Secondly, in addressing the problem of translation, Ricoeur
provides us with a criterion for determining whether real work, as opposed to feather bedding, is
done. He takes translation to be, in part, a matter of "saying the same thing in other words."
Now, rhetoric can be seen in a similar way, that is, as a matter of "saying the same thing in other
words" where the first words are the proper words and the others are figurative. If the figurative
is only cosmetic, translators can be happy with just the proper. If they are unhappy, then the
figurative may not be just cosmetic. And if the text is an argued text and if the translators are
unhappy getting just the proper right, then the figurative bits may be said to contribute
something to the argument. Setting aside matters of translation, will something go missing if we
try to cut through Ricoeur's rhetoric so as to put what he says in other, proper words? What is
that something? That is the question.
A full answer to the question will involve following Ricoeur's text from beginning to end.
That is the only way to see all the work the figures, metaphor, hyperbole, and others, do as they
weave through the text or get called back repeatedly. However, a partial answer can be found
1
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and a start on the fuller one made by calling attention to the ways Ricoeur uses rhetoric, firstly,
in setting out the bill he wants to fill and the ways he will fill it and, then, in making and bringing
off his first substantive step.
Bill filling
Deux voies d'acces s'offrent au problème posé par l'acte de traduire: soit prendre le terme
traduction au sens strict de transfert d'un message verbal d'une langue dans une autre, soit
le prendre au sens large, comme synonyme de l'interprétation de tout ensemble signifiant
à l'intérieur de la même communauté linguistigue.
Les deux approches ont leur droit: la première, choisie par Antoine Bermann dans
l'Épreuve de l'étranger, tient compte du fait massif de la pluralité et diversité des langues;
la seconde, suive par George Steiner dans Après Babel, s'adresse directement au
phénomène englobant que l'auteur résume ainsi: « comprendre, c'est traduire ». J'ai choisi
de partir de la première, qui fait passer au premier plan le rapport du propre à l'étranger,
et ainsi de conduire à la seconde sous la conduite des difficultés et paradoxes suscités par
la traduction d'une langue dans une autre. (1999: 8)

Ricoeur's first words are: Deux voies d'accès s'offrent au problème posé par l'acte de
traduire (...). This could be translated as :
(A) Two access roads lead to the problem raised by the act of translating ...
or
(B) Two roads offer access to the problem raised by the act of translating ...
These two versions seem to be equivalent, they appear to say pretty much the same thing in
other words and in different ways. It is, of course, a commonplace to talk about method in terms
of roads, paths, tracks, and so on. If Ricoeur is just recalling the standard, worn metaphor,
clearly, saying "two access roads" or "two roads offer access" will not make much difference.
But that Ricoeur may be doing a bit more is fairly easy to see. "Voies d'accès" and "access
roads" are, loosely speaking, fairly new terms, at least in philosophical prose, and we may see
Ricoeur as updating the metaphor. Still, if this were all he is doing, updating a worn metaphor
would be mostly a matter of enlivening his text, of making it more attractive or readable. Then,
between versions (A) and (B), there would be stylistic differences, but no substantive
differences. The information or the propositional content is the same: there are two ways to get
at the problem raised by the act of translation. Saying it one way is a bit less lively, but still no
real damage is done either way -- providing the story stops here. It does not. (So as to keep my
attention on the matter of method and metaphor, I want to forget about the verb "offrir" which is
used figuratively and presents its own little selection of wonderments.)
Ricoeur's second paragraph starts out with "Les deux approches ont leur droit." This can be
rendered in English as : "The two approaches are legitimate". Replacing "Two access roads" by
"two approaches" may be just a matter of substituting equivalent or synonymous terms one for
the other, but then again it may be a case of correcting or focusing the "access road" picture, a
matter then of epanorthosis. It is easy to see Ricoeur as correcting or focusing the access road
picture as soon as we notice that the approaches are both legitimate. That is to say, both
approaches yield valid results or get us to where it is Ricoeur wants to get us. If this is right,
then we may have to see his access road metaphor not as an update or a renewal of the worn
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standard metaphor, but rather as way of calling attention to some special or new feature of his
own method that is in contrast with and opposed to the standard issue method.
The contrast becomes sharper and the opposition deeper as soon as we recall the ways we
have learned to think and talk about method: orderly procedures, straightforward business,
guaranteed results, along with competent guides or ship pilots and captains as the seafaring Kant
put this part, and so on. In substituting "approach" for "access roads," Ricoeur makes it clear
that his method is not straightforward, risk free, and the results are not guaranteed. It's a matter
of getting closer to, of moving near, of something tentative, suggested (note: "suggest" is
Ricoeur's preferred verb for signalling stopping points, conclusions, outcomes or results).
Moreover, if readers do notice that the two approaches are put on the same footing, the
contrast between Ricoeur's method and the standard issue one becomes still more marked. Those
philosophers who do talk about two or more roads hardly ever see these roads as equals. We are
expected to choose between them. They are competing alternatives. But the "choice" is illusory
in one or both of two ways. Firstly, while Descartes does not hold the patent on this, he did put it
clearly and distinctly: if we disagree or make mistakes or misunderstand, it's because we fail to
use the same and right and only method, that is, we go off and choose the wrong method.
"Choice", when it is used, clearly replaces "impose", "obligate", "necessitate", and all their
neighbours. It is a way of saying one thing and meaning another, a nicer, kinder, gentler way of
putting us on the right road. Secondly, there is a slight tendency to set the roads up as
dichotomies, antinomies, aporia, antithesis, and the rest just so as to better put the preferred one
in the limelight. And we might want to recall what Austin said about other famous dichotomies:
"they live by taking in each other's washing" (1964: 4).
For Ricoeur, the antithesis is not between the two approaches (Berman and Steiner) but
between the standard issue method and the one he favours. This opposition is easy to see if we
notice that Ricoeur replaces "problem" with "difficulties and paradoxes" and throughout his text
by "enigma", "dilemma", "challenge", "irreversible situations", "test" and so on. If we notice
these substitutions, we will see that the bill Ricoeur sets out to fill will not be one of solving
problems but one of showing that this or that way of taking a question, a fact, makes better sense
and is preferable. This, of course, puts "choices" or "decisions" front and centre in Ricoeur's
approach. Indeed it is not hard to see choice or decision as his trademark: he decides on the
evidence that such and such a fact means, fits this way, is a case of (...), etc. And this takes us to
the next step.
Getting us to see differently
Cette obscure clarté qui tombe des étoiles (Corneille, Le Cid, Acte IV, scène III).

Ricoeur wants to make sense of three facts put in evidence by the act of translating. The
first fact is that of the plurality and diversity of languages -- the Babel phenomenon. The second
is the fact of translation itself -- humans have always translated in doing business, in making war
or love. The third fact is that we use language both to go public and to hide, to tell the full story
and not let any secrets out. The sense he makes of these facts will be the outcome or the
conclusion of everything he says and does in his text.
However, the success or failure of his attempt to do this, the acceptability of the sense he
makes, turns on his getting the readers to see these facts not as an ordinary facts but as enigmas
(or eventually their close neighbours, paradoxes, dilemmas, and the rest). Put in another way,
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the sense he makes as well as the sense of his attempt will be seen as credible, enlightening,
enriching, preferable, and acceptable to the extent that readers see these facts as calling for or
requiring special treatment.
His first substantive step, then, is to show that the fact of the plurality and diversity of
languages is not an ordinary fact but an enigma. The sense or meaning of this fact is unclear. It
is hard to know what to make of this fact. This is what Ricoeur has to show. (We could say, in
other words, that this is still part of the bill setting (stasis).)
In casting this fact as an enigma, Ricoeur prepares, opens the door for his next step which
will be to show that the ordinary ways of making sense, the speculative, theoretical ways, indeed
fail, in fact and in principle, to throw any light on this enigma. Then he will go on to oppose the
speculative/theoretical to the practical/ethical and suggest that the challenges translators face are
ethical ones as opposed to theoretical or technical ones. He will replace the
speculative/theoretical alternative -- translatable/untranslatable -- by the practical alternative -fidelity/betrayal. He will suggest, too, that the ways translators meet these challenges can be a
paradigm, a best example for us whenever we come up against similar enigmas. This is not the
full story. However, enough has been said for everyone to see that Ricoeur has to start out by
convincing his readers of the extraordinary character of the first fact he encounters.
How, then, does Ricoeur get his readers to see that the fact of the plurality and diversity of
languages is an enigma? The short answer is that he argues. The longer answer is that he leads
his readers from the familiar to the unfamiliar, from that about which we are confident to that
about which we are less so, by drawing contrasts or opposing this fact to other facts and
expectations in sharp and striking ways which are continually reinforced. He does it, too, by
reassuring his readers of his objectivity or fairness or balance. It is, of course, not good enough to
just say this, any instruction will come "in drawing the coverts of the microglot, in hounding
down the minutiae" (Austin, 1979: 175). We have to see and count the ways. We need his text:
Let's start off then with the plurality and diversity of languages, and let's take note of a first
fact: it is because humans speak different languages that translation exists. This fact is that of the
diversity of languages, to borrow Wilhelm von Humboldt's title. Now this fact is at the same
time an enigma: why not one language, and above all why so many languages, five or six
thousand say the ethnologists? Every Darwinian criteria of utility and adaptation in the struggle
for survival are put in disarray; this innumerable multiplicity is not only useless, it is harmful. In
fact, if communication within the community is assured by the integrative power of each
language taken separately, communication outside the community is made, at the limit,
impracticable by what Steiner calls "a destructive prodigality". But what is enigmatic is not only
the jamming of communication, that the Babel myth, of which we will speak further on, calls
"dispersion" on the level of geography and "confusion" on the level of communication, it is also
the contrast with other traits which also touch on language. First, the weighty fact of the
universality of language: "All humans speak"; this is a criterion of humanity along side the tool,
the institution, the sepulture; by language, let's understand the use of signs which are not things,
but count for things -- the exchange of signs in interlocution --, the major role of language on the
level of community identification; here is a universal competency contradicted/denied belied by
its fragmented, disseminated, dispersed performances. Whence the speculations first on the level
of the myth, then on that of the philosophy of language when it raises the question of the origin
of the dispersion-confusion. In that respect, the myth of Babel, too brief and too cloudy in its
literary composition, makes us dream backwards in the direction of a presumed lost paradisiacal
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language, more than it offers a guide to lead us in this labyrinth. The dispersion confusion is then
seen as irremediable linguistic catastrophe. I will suggest in a moment a kinder reading of the
ordinary human condition. (1999: 8-9)
Seeing and counting the ways
Opposition (or contrast, as Ricoeur puts it) figures large and centrally. The familiar fact of
the plurality and diversity of languages is set off against our expectation of a single language (a
more or less equally familiar fact). It is not juxtaposed as in Corneille's oxymoron but set out as
a question whose force or pressing character is underscored by the progression from "one
language" to "so many" to "five or six thousand" (epanorthosis, gradation). Setting the
expectation out as a question is a discursive strategy imprinting both direction and movement.
More importantly, the fact of the expectation is backed up, guaranteed by Darwin (authority,
recall, this is part of the familiarity bit) and the contrast made more striking, stronger by the
hyperbole: "put in disarray" and "innumerable multiplicity" (which may run close to a pleonasm)
and still more so by epanorthosis, gradation again: "not only useless, but harmful". We have,
then, a striking contrast between what we get (plurality and diversity) and what we expect (one);
all of which makes this fact hard to understand, we don't know what to make of it. It looks like
an enigma. All bumble bees can follow bumble bee instructions, why can we not "follow" one
another?
But Ricoeur makes a concession and, in a way, displays his fairness, objectivity, openmindedness, and the rest: the fact does indeed satisfy the Darwinian criteria of utility and
adaptation. There is no opposition between Darwinian criteria and particular languages, indeed
speaking the same language is required for the survival of a particular community. Then,
however, he takes it all back, by changing the referent from a particular community to the
species (call this the globalization move) and exacerbates the contrast with more hyperbole:
"destructive prodigality" renders communication between different linguistic communities "at
the limit impracticable" (note: he does not say "impossible"). And so we are still stumped by the
fact of the innumerable multiplicity of languages and really begin to see the fact as an enigma.
The contrast is redrawn or redescribed in still more striking terms: "jamming of
communication", "dispersion" and "confusion" and with reference to another familiar item -- the
Babel myth. This redrawn contrast is not so much discounted as it is overshadowed by another
contrast, namely the contrast between a universal linguistic competency and its particular,
idiomatic performance. Ricoeur underscores, draws attention to the overshadowing by
qualifying the new fact as a "very important fact". The first fact went unqualified, so the
overshadowing and contrast are reinforced.
It is still a question of criteria, but now, in contrast with Darwinian criteria which apply
across the board, we get a species relevant criterion, one which is definitive of the human
species. We are still on familiar ground just because everyone is supposed to know that one way
of defining human beings is to say that they all talk (use language) and that they do so as a matter
of fact and principle even if some of them don't speak Greek or know how to say logos. Ricoeur
reinforces and assures the familiarity of the linguistic criterion ("All human being speak") by
putting it in parallel with or along side other known criteria -- all human beings are tool users,
institution builders, and they all bury their dead (and if anyone remembers that Dutch hoes are
different from English hoes like Civil law is different from Common law or an Irish wake from a
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French one, Ricoeur may be seen as pushing the enigma beyond linguistic facts to include other
facts about the species). The contrast between this universal competency and its local or
particular performances is made striking by his choice of the verb "contradicted" and the
cascade, if not gradation, going from "fragmented", to "disseminated" to "dispersed" (words that
are clearly not unrelated to Babel; their recall, here, keeps the readers eyes on the road). Now
the fact of the plurality and diversity of languages looks like a real hair-puller, a full blown
enigma. Ricoeur has made his point.
The next nine lines are transitional. They prepare readers for the next step. "Whence"
connects this first step (it is the riser/contremarche) to the next step whereon Ricoeur examines
different attempts to make sense of this enigma. This connection is underscored in different
ways. "Speculation", of course, answers the question: What do we do when faced with an
enigma? But the choice of this word clearly recalls and reinforces the opposition between
problem and enigma. Problems get solved, enigmas give rise to speculation (hypotheses,
theories, not to say guesses). "Speculation" must be contrasted, too, with "reading" which comes
up in the last sentence and is a familiar substitute for "interpretation". Ricoeur announces the
tenor of what's to come (or to keep the metaphor running, the roughness of the road ahead) by
giving a negative cast to "speculation". He does this by associating it with "myth," the myth of
Babel ("myth" rather than "story" or "account"). And, if anyone notices the sequencing -- "on
the level of myth firstly, then on that of the philosophy of language" --, there will be a temptation
to complete the sequence with it's final positive level: "science" or linguistics and ethnology.
And if anyone does this, they are sent backwards to Darwin and forward to Sapir and Whorf and
Chomsky and Bacon and Leibnitz and Olander and Benjamin (these are the items on the next
step all of which will come tumbling down). Anyhow, I think this is the way Ricoeur keeps his
readers on track, pointed in the right direction. But he also takes back some of the roughness or
unpleasantness with "suggestion", "kinder" and the substitution of "ordinary human condition"
for "Babel". In doing this, he is reassuring. It's not all negative. The sense to be made of the
plurality and diversity of languages may not be that of an "irremediable linguistic catastrophe".
A last word on words. "Labyrinth" works for "method", "enigma" and, properly in these last
lines, for the Babel myth. This, too, is a way of underscoring the tight weave of the text.
Doing the real work
My job is to show that, in this paragraph, the figures Ricoeur uses, the rhetorical moves he
makes just are the proof he gives to support his casting the fact of the plurality and diversity of
languages as an enigma. Put another way round, my job is to show that stripping away the
rhetoric leaves us with a product that is not argumentatively equivalent to the original.
Rhetoric cut through and through
Cutting through the rhetoric is a matter of saying the same thing in other words, proper
words rather than figurative ones. Someone says: "If March comes in like a lion, it goes out like
a lamb" and someone else says: "That sounds nice, but cut the fluff and say what you mean".
The first someone then puts it properly, in ordinary words, by saying, "If March begins with
rough weather, it ends with calm weather". Cutting through the rhetoric may be, of course, both
a matter of words and a matter of ways. There are proper ways of requesting the salt and then
there are figurative ways. One way may be substituted for the other: We can properly say:
"Please pass the salt" or figuratively: "Can you pass the salt?" "Is there any salt in this house?"
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"Who hid the salt?" "Did you forget the salt?" "What's missing in this otherwise superb ragout is
salt" This list of possible substitutions could go on and on, but I think two things are already
clear enough.
Firstly, while any of these ways may get the salt shaker into our hands, we are doing more
than just asking for the salt or just asking for it in a fancy way. We are saying something about
personal relationships, domestic management, culinary skills, and so on. Indeed, we are
confirming or even putting in place certain relationships. Secondly, talk about rhetoric in terms
of the proper and the figurative and the substitution of one for the other may be a red flag, a
warning -- something unusual is up. However, this way of talking may be disastrously
misleading if it is taken to mean that the figurative will always be a substitute, a special kind of
synonym, having the same or equivalent value as some original, proper way or word, which with
a little effort and scratching, we can bring to the surface, unmask. Strictly speaking, there are
cases where there are no proper ways or words (catachresis).
If this is right, cutting through the rhetoric so as to find the proper kernel of meaning may be
in, some cases, the wrong thing to do. I think it is clearly wrong in the case of Gibbon. He
wrote: "Boethius stooped, or, to speak more truly, rose to the social duties of public and private
life" (Furbank, 2000: 58). This is a clear case of epanorthosis, of saying one thing and then
correcting it or taking it back by saying something else. In this case, Gibbon says the opposite.
Is there a proper way of saying what Gibbon said? Can the trope be eliminated? We might
think that to do so will be just to strike either:
(A) "stooped, or, to speak more truly,"
or
(B) "or, to speak more truly, rose"
or
(C) write two sentences.
However, striking (A) or (B) or writing two sentences involves making a decision as to what
Gibbon was saying, properly speaking. Such a decision is rife with risk just because what
Gibbon did say was both "stoop" and "rise". My suggestion is that to make Gibbon talk straight
or proper will be either to:
(A) describe what he said and did -- Gibbon applied one predicate and then overrode it with
its opposite;
or
(B) say: "What he really meant was ________" (perhaps only mad March hares will rush in
to fill this blank).
The damage or loss will be still more manifest should anyone try to put Corneille's "obscure
clarté" in other words, proper ones.
Cutting through Ricoeur's rhetoric seems to me to be like cutting through Gibbon's. We can
describe what he said and did or we can say in other words what we believe he really meant but
did not exactly or properly say. However, if we believe that Ricoeur said and did what he meant
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to say and do (save some obvious slips or oversights), taking the rhetoric out of his text comes
down to describing it (8). Such a description might look like this:
The fact of the plurality and diversity of languages is an enigma for two reasons. Firstly, it
contrasts with (is incompatible or incongruous with) everything that the Darwinian criteria of
utility and adaptation in the struggle for survival of a species lead us to expect (the criteria call
for one language). Secondly, it contrasts with the fact that the ability to use language is a
defining trait of humanness (the definition leads us to expect a single language). The warrant
might look like this: if a fact is indeed a fact but contrasts with (is incompatible or incongruous)
our expectations or other known facts, that fact can be said to be an enigma providing that (1) the
fact is not an accident or abberation of some kind and (2) our expectations can backed up.
All this could, of course, be put in some other words or in some different ways, but these
words and ways will be good enough to set up a comparison. On the one hand, the description
(figureless version) tells the reader that a fact contrasts with other sets of facts and expectations
and for that reason the first fact has to be taken as an enigma. On the other hand, Ricoeur's
argument gets the reader to see the contrast and, as a result of seeing the contrast, see (or draw
the conclusion) that the fact really is hard to understand (it is an enigma). His argument, his
evidence, is to be found in the drawing of contrasts like Gibbon's "message" is to be found in the
opposition between Boethius's stooping and rising to social duties. Take the figures away and
there is no evidence or, more exactly, there is only an outline, a shadow of his argument. This is
a matter of principle and not one of words.
If this is right or close to being right, it is not hard to see that rhetoric does some real work in
Ricoeur's argument. But it will be hard to say that rhetoric is just an add-on, an ornament or a
dimension of his argument. Clearly, we cannot read his argument -- follow it, understand it, or
eventually criticize it -- without noticing the ways in which the ways he says things, the figures
he uses, are his proofs. These are steps we cannot skip without misconstruing his argument.
Why, then, is it so easy, so common, to believe that saying: "rhetorical argument" counts an
oxymoron?
When it's not just rhetoric
[La rhétorique] oscille entre deux pôles qui la constituent: la preuve et la persuasion.
Quand la persuasion s'affranchit du souci de la preuve, le désir de séduire et de plaire
l'emporte, et le style lui-même n'est plus figure, au sens de visage d'un corps -- mais
ornement , au sens « cosmétique » du mot. (La métaphore vive, 1976: 46-47)

Ricoeur will answer this question. Getting the answer out will be easier if we recall the
classical work order for proving things drawn up in rough form by Ramus and sharpened up by
Pascal. Pascal split the question of proof in two: on the one hand there is the matter of proving;
on the other, there is the matter of adapting proofs to the "inconsistencies of our caprices" (cf.
Descombes, 1976: 72). On one side, only the truth counts. On the other side, our "assent" to the
truth counts. Assent is a good thing in itself but it is sometimes hard to get just because we have
so many interests, desires, leanings, and all kinds of other subjective, psychological veils. These
are resistances which cloud our intellect or fuzz-up our logic. In this information age, we might
call these resistances "fire-walls". In any case, this is where rhetoric goes to work. Its job is to
overcome these resistances, break through the fire-walls, by making the truth attractive, lively,
full of colour, light and flowers (colores, lumina, flores, cf. Barthes, 1970: 218), or crack the
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code. The figures are the language of the passions (Lamy); they move us to assent (to the truth)
but they have no probative power. Rhetoric adapts the truth to our fluctuating and fanciful
nature, but has no part in making it (evident).
Ricoeur's tack is to deny the last part -- figures can play a truth making role. He supports
this break with the classical dichotomy by recalling a partly forgotten, partly ignored lesson once
taught by Aristotle (1975: 13-46). This lesson has to do with the recognition of the various kinds
of truth and the different ways of proceeding in finding and establishing them. Put another way
round, his lesson is that one-size-fits-all work orders turn out to be procrustean (see: Ricoeur on
Kant's single mindedness, 1986: 278). Different kinds of issues call for different work orders
involving different considerations -- "Whether we ought to strike a match or not" is not the same
as or equal to, on any level of reflection, "Whether we ought to go to war or not" and neither are
the same as or equal to "Will an aspirin a day keep the doctor away or not?" (cf. Austin, 1979:
179).
The part of Aristotle's lesson that has not been forgotten, not wholly anyhow, is that there
are some kinds of truth (or issues) that don't have much to do with us. We can discover or get
close to these truths, settle the issues, by looking, experimenting (generous funding helps),
putting two and two together, and minding our p's and q's. Everyone recognizes or
acknowledges these truths providing the blinding veils of subjectivity are pulled back. Here the
old saw about truth always prevailing is just another way of saying: "It's true whatever you
think." Proof, then, of course, is compelling even though not everyone will be compelled all the
time when faced with truths of this sort (Triangles have three sides, no matter how many you
count; An aspirin a day will likely keep the doctor away, if all the research is any good).
The other kinds of truth, or issues, have much more to do with us. They are, in various
ways, "social constructions". In various ways and up to a point, they are of our making. They
depend, too, in various ways and up to a point, on assent, on procuring assent. This is the part of
Aristotle's lesson we tend to forget, ignore, or get slightly wrong (Ricoeur reports that Kant
forgot or ignored it and if Hegel remembered it, he still got it slightly wrong (1986: 276, 282);
without doubt an a fortiori here). To put this second part of Aristotle's lesson in the best light,
Ricoeur recalls that the Greeks recognized how the word, the well turned word, eloquence, had
the power to make some stories or propositions persuasive (1976: 13-15). Under the heading
"rhetoric", they catalogued all the foolproof and time-tested turns and eloquent strategies
according to their power to procure assent. Socrates and Plato, as everyone knows, threw the
catalogue out as a matter of principle -- eloquence was misleading, persuasion unnecessary.
Aristotle, however, qualified this principle: eloquence alone can be misleading but persuasion is
sometimes necessary. And then he kept the catalogue and paired persuasion with proof.
Aristotle's qualification of this principle and his pairing of persuasion with proof are
grounded in his pluralism (ontological and epistemological). There are different kinds of truth or
issues some of which have to do with the order of human affairs, a "variable and decision
dependant" order (cf. Ricoeur, 1986: 278). The appropriate work order for getting at the truth
these kinds of issues put in play will involve doing what persuasion is good at -- procuring assent
-- and at the same time, doing what proof is good at -- providing evidence (that is, excluding the
arbitrary, the capricious, the prejudged). Put another way, this work order is tailored to handle
certain kinds of facts and notably those facts Ricoeur calls the "in spite of" facts: "in spite of
fratricides, we promote (campaign for) universal fraternity" or "we translate in spite of the
irreducible differences of idioms" (1999: 12). This work order allows us to conjoin features that
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logic would have us keep apart. And in conjoining these features brings to light new aspects of
the facts. Corneille's obscure clarté counts among the best examples of the work this work order
can do.
The pairing of persuasion with proof will not subordinate persuasion to proof or dress it up
(this was one of Pascal's ideas), but will, as Ricoeur puts it, give persuasion (figures and tropes) a
probatory force and proof a persuasive force. Rhetoric is, on this account, the invention of
figures that create and maintain a tension between, or a balancing of, persuasion and proof. In
this way rhetoric gives us the means to satisfy all at once the need to procure assent and the need
to give proof or evidence.
If Ricoeur (and Aristotle) is right about this, there are some important lessons to be learned
(recalled). Firstly, it is clear that, in some arguments, the how will be inseparable for the what.
Rhetoric is not a discursive dimension or tier to be examined separately from an illative one.
Nor will it be a second rate kind of proof or a proof tailored to the weak-minded. It is proof
suited to the nature of the issue at hand. And so using rhetoric can be the right thing to do and
when used with excellence merits praise (encomonium).
When it's just rhetoric
But rhetoric can be misused. This will be Ricoeur's second lesson (and Aristotle's up to a
point). The tension or balance which makes the how inseparable from the what can be broken. It
will be broken whenever the "the honest desire to convince" (Ricoeur, 1999: 18, my emphasis) is
eclipsed by the desire to win, to succeed in securing assent by any means (seduction or
intimidation), independent of understanding ("assent without understanding" (Gross, 1996: 23).
But it is possible, too, that we get carried away by our eloquence or the magic of words and
allow them to carry the burden without proof. In either case, the tension between persuasion and
proof is broken and we get just rhetoric, feats of prose, ornament. Cutting through the rhetoric
may be just the thing do.
Rhetoric, on Ricoeur's account, like translation, serves two masters (this is the key metaphor
in his full argument). When it serves one more than the other, it fails itself and becomes a term
of reproach: just rhetoric (or just a translation). And, so, it easier to understand how "rhetoric" is
sometimes a term of praise and sometimes one of blame.
Flouting "the honest desire to convince", of course, is not the same thing as failing to fill the
work order. Here shortfalls may come less from any pretending, tricks or infatuation and more
from our lack of inventiveness. It's not easy to invent or stumble on the right figures. This takes
us to the last question: How does Ricoeur's third paragraph fare in the invention department, as
rhetorical argument?
"Rhetorical argument" as pleonasm
The application of Ricoeur's criteria -- honest desire to convince, the absence of seductive or
intimidating strategies -- is fraught with risk. On the one hand they are not so much criteria as
they are standards everyone is expected to meet (cf. Grice, 1989). On the other hand, taking
them to be criteria, it will be hard to pick out any failures just because dishonest intentions,
seduction or intimidation work if they are indiscernible from the real things like good counterfeit
banknotes get accepted when they are indiscernible from the real things.
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"Misleading", however, may be a criterion easier to apply. Anyhow, it is one that applies
nicely to figures. We can use figures, say and do one thing so as to say and do some other thing,
only if we suppose that no one will be misled. We can talk about a knockdown argument only if
we believe that no one will call the police, look on floor, order body bags, or whatever. And so
one way of answering the question about Ricoeur's rhetoric will be to ask: Is anyone taken in by
all his hyperbole or misled by the epanorthoses or any of the other figures? Some of us may be
put off by the repetitions (almost every sentence) and not notice how they build up his case, but
no one, or hardly anyone, will take Ricoeur's excursions in hyperbole to have been offered as
true, precise, accurate, and complete descriptions rather than as ways of getting his readers to see
the importance of what is being underscored, emphasized and as ways of getting them to see that
the fact of the multiplicity of languages is incompatible with Darwinian criteria (utility,
adaptation) and other facts about language. Should we not see how hyperbole and epanorthosis
are connected to contrasting, they will be at their best cosmetic, at their worst inaccurate if not
false statements. Ricoeur's argument hinges on seeing the figures as evidence for saying that the
facts are enigmas. Taking the figures away takes his argument away; not noticing the figures
and the work they do is to not notice the argument and mistake his text for an exhortation or
something else.
Addenda
1. On translating figures:
Intervient ici la rhétorique avec ses figures de style, ses tropes, métaphore et autres, et
tous les jeux de langage au service de stratégies innombrables, parmi lesquelles la
séduction et l'intimidation aux dépens de l'honnête souci de convaincre. (1999: 18)

Here is a figure. It is a zeugma or a syllepsis, that is to say a sentence in which a singular
verb has two subjects, one singular and one plural with the verb postposed. This could be
paraphrased loosely but I think accurately as:
Here [in argued texts] rhetoric with its figures of style, its tropes, metaphors and others
comes into play, along with all the language games serving innumerable strategies among which
those of seduction and intimidation come in at the expense of the honest desire to convince.
A careful, professional translator might be able to preserve the figure which though not
common does occur in English. But the point here is that any attempt to say what Ricoeur says
in other words is likely to fail because what he says can not be separated from the way in which
he says it; the paraphrase leaves out or misses part of the meaning, the job the zeugma does in
the original text. The figure really works in the original text.
To see this work, it will be enough to recall, firstly, that Ricoeur claims that translators serve
two masters: the author and the public. And secondly that Puttenham likens the zeugma to
someone serving two masters. Ricoeur's use of this particular figure becomes rather sublime. It
connects the way something is said to what is said elsewhere in the text. Taken as a zeugma
rather than a mistake or oversight in the agreement between verbs and subjects or, rather than
looking at the postposing of the verb as a stylistic artifice, we will now see an illustration, an
example of something serving two masters. It may be said, too, that the effect of this figure is to
support part of Ricoeur's main claim by giving an example. If this is missed, part of the support
he gives is missed too. And then there is the postposed verb and the emphasis on action.
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2. On ordinary facts
What is an ordinary fact? What is the ordinary treatment? Ordinary facts will fit our
working models or our explanatory schemata. Whether these models and schemata are taken to
mirror the immanent structure of reality, its laws or whether they are taken to be social
constructions, the models and schemata are expected to fit the facts and vice versa. It's a matter
of principle. Every fact has its model like every pot has its cover. So in principle we can find
the model that fits the fact just as we can always find the cover for the pot.
If, in principle, all facts must fit our models or schemata, when some fact fails to fit we will
call it a problem and solve it by:
1) looking for a model or schema that fits or
2) adjusting, reenginering or even replacing our models and schemata with different
ones or
3) calling it an error or mistake in reporting (We say: "White wires connected to
white wires, blacks to blacks, it does not make sense that the light does not work,
it's not logical." Then we remember the breaker. A fuller description and the light
comes on. We see that the little problem has been solved -- the facts do indeed fit
the model -- and we, red faced, recognize and take back our hyperbole).
If none of the above work, we come to grips with the problematic fact by:
4) putting it on hold (When the human genomic map is completed ...) or
a. sometimes kicking it upstairs and handing it over to the philosophers for
safekeeping (Austin has the patent on this expression) or
5) calling it irrational, saying that it makes no sense (this is Allan Greenspan's tack
when he calls the slowdown in the American economy (fact) not rational because
it fails to fit economic models (Ottawa Citizen, 14 February 2001: 1).).
Such are the ways of ordinary facts. These are some of the ways (hardly an exhaustive list)
ordinary facts become problematic and some of the ways in which we make their problematic
character go away. We get them to fit (solve them) or set them aside or dismiss them.
What then is an enigma? It is a fact all right and it fails to fit our models or explanatory
schemata. However, it differs from an ordinary fact and an ordinary problem in that neither a
fuller description of the fact nor a revised model or schema will guarantee a fit or a solution.
Moreover, we can not set it aside, kick it upstairs or dismiss it because we take the fact to make
sense and a sense that is of some immediate interest or importance (the fact is not an accident, it
is not gratuitous, etc). Put another way, it is a matter of principle: these facts cannot fit or be
made to fit (without damage) the models or explanatory schemata to which we fit ordinary facts.
An enigma is a fact said to make sense in spite of the fact that it fails to fit our models or
explanatory schemata. Making sense of an enigma then cannot be a matter of fitting it, or
finding a place for it, in some grand scheme of things; the sense it makes does not come from its
relation to models or explanatory schema. But what's left? The sense we make of an enigma
depends on a decision, a choice that unless it is gratuitous or arbitrary (if these are different) can
be shown, and indeed must be shown, to be preferable to other possible choices (cf. Ricoeur,
1986: 276).
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3. Here's Ricoeur's text untranslated:
Partons donc de la pluralité et de la diversité des langues, et notons un premier fait: c'est
parce que les hommes parlent des langues différentes que la traduction existe. Ce fait est
celui de la diversité des langues, pour reprendre le titre de Wilhem von Humboldt. Or ce
fait est en même temps un énigme: pourquoi pas une seule langue, et surtout pourquoi
tant de langues, cinq ou six mille disent les ethnologues? Tout critère darwinien d'utilité
et d'adaptation dans la lutte pour la survie est mis en déroute; cett multiplicité
indénombrable est non seulement inutile, mais nuisible. En effet, si l'échange
intracommunautaire est assuré par la puissance d'intégration de chaque langue prise
séparément, l'échange avec le dehors de la communauté langagière est rendu à la limite
impracticable par ce que Steiner nomme « une prodigalité néfaste » Mais, ce qui fait
énigme ce n'est pas seulement le brouillage de la communication, que le mythe de Babel,
dont nous allons parler plus loin, nomme « dispersion » au plan géographique et «
confusion » au plan de la communication, c'est aussi le contraste avec d'autres traits qui
touchent aussi au langage. D'abord, le fait considérable de l'universalité du langage: «
Tous les hommes parlent »; c'est là un critère de l'humanité à côté de l'outil, de
l'institution, de la sépulture; par langage, entendons l'usage des signes qui ne sont pas des
choses, mais valent pour des choses -- l'échange des signes dans l'interlocution --, le rôle
majeur d'une langue commune au plan de l'identification communautaire; voilà une
compétence universelle démentie par ses performances locales, une capacité universelle
démentie par son effectuation éclatée, disséminée, dispersée. D'où les spéculations au
plan du mythe d'abord, puis à celui de la philosophie du langage quand celle-ci s'interroge
sur l'origine de la dispersion-confusion. À cet égard, le mythe de Babel, trop bref et trop
brouillé dans sa facture littéraire, fait davantage rêver à reculons en direction d'une
présumée lang paradisiaque perdue, qu'il n'offre de guide pour se conduire dans ce
labyrinthe. La dispersion-confusion est alors perçue comme une catastrophe langagière
irrémédiable. Je suggérerai dans un instant une lecture plus bienveillante à l'égard de la
condition ordinaire des humains. (1999: 8-9)

References
Austin, John Langsford. 1964. Sense and Sensibilia. New York, Oxford University Press.
Austin, John Langsford. 1979. "A Plea for Excuses." In Philosophical Papers. Oxford, Oxford University
Press, 175-204.
Barthes, Rolland. 1970. "L'ancienne rhétorique." Communications 16: 172-229.
Descombes, Vincent. 1973. "Défense et illustration de l'argument d'autorité." In Philosophie et relations
interpersonnelles. Montréal, Presses de l'université de Montréal, 69-86.
Furbank, P. N. 2000. "Epic-Making." The New York Review of Books, November 30: 57-59.
Grice, H.P. 1989. Studies in the Way of Words. Cambridge, Massachusetts, Harvard University Press.
Gross, Allan. 1996. The Rhetoric of Science. Cambridge, Massachusetts, Harvard University Press.
Ricoeur, Paul. 2000. "L'écriture de l'histoire et la représentation du passé." Le monde, 15 juin: 16.
Ricoeur, Paul. 1975. La métaphore vive. Paris, Éditions du Seuil.
Ricoeur, Paul. 1986. "La raison pratique." In Du texte à l'action. Paris, Éditions du Seuil, 263-288.
Ricoeur, Paul. 1999. "Le paradigme de la traduction." Esprit 6: 8-19.

